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Experimental manipulations of body ownership have indicated that multisensory
integration is central to forming bodily self-representation. Voluntary self-touch is a unique
multisensory situation involving corresponding motor, tactile and proprioceptive signals.
Yet, even though self-touch is frequent in everyday life, its contribution to the formation
of body ownership is not well understood. Here we investigated the role of voluntary
self-touch in body ownership using a novel adaptation of the rubber hand illusion (RHI),
in which a robotic system and virtual reality allowed participants self-touch of real and
virtual hands. In the first experiment, active and passive self-touch were applied in the
absence of visual feedback. In the second experiment, we tested the role of visual
feedback in this bodily illusion. Finally, in the third experiment, we compared active
and passive self-touch to the classical RHI in which the touch is administered by the
experimenter. We hypothesized that active self-touch would increase ownership over
the virtual hand through the addition of motor signals strengthening the bodily illusion.
The results indicated that active self-touch elicited stronger illusory ownership compared
to passive self-touch and sensory only stimulation, and show an important role for active
self-touch in the formation of bodily self.
Keywords: sense of body ownership, sense of agency, self-touch, rubber hand illusion, multisensory integration,
volition, robotics and haptic technology
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental aspect of the experience of the self is the sensation that we have a body (body
ownership) and that we control the actions of that body (agency) (Merleau-Ponty, 1996; Gallagher,
2000; Jeannerod, 2003). Body ownership is based on the correspondence and integration of
multisensory signals (e.g., Ehrsson et al., 2004; Blanke, 2012; Salomon et al., 2013b). Agency,
the sense of control over one’s own actions, is thought to rely on integration of efferent and
afferent sensorimotor information (Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Haggard, 2005; David et al., 2008;
Jeannerod, 2009). A particular and relevant case in which body ownership and self-generated action
interact is self-touch. Self-touch is thought to engender a basic form of self-awareness (Gallagher
and Meltzoff, 1996; Merleau-Ponty, 1996), and has been suggested to contribute to structural and
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conscious representations of the body (Dieguez et al., 2009;
Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2009; Kammers et al., 2010; van Stralen
et al., 2011; Blanke et al., 2014). Self-touch is an important cue for
body ownership since it includes a multisensory correspondence
between two simultaneous tactile inputs (e.g., the hand that
is touching and the hand that is being touched) coupled with
corresponding motor and proprioceptive signals. Self-touch thus
uniquely specifies one’s own body as distinct from other objects in
the environment. Developmentally, discrimination of self-touch
vs. external touch arises early in life. Indeed, it has been shown
that infants can discriminate self-touch from external touchwhen
they are only 24 h old (Rochat and Hespos, 1997) and self-touch
has been suggested to be important for the development of the
sense of self in infancy (Rochat, 1998). Investigation of self-
touch revealed that self-generated action reduces the perceived
intensity of the tactile stimulation occurring simultaneously with
the action (Weiskrantz et al., 1971; Blakemore et al., 1998, 1999).
These findings speak in favor of a predictive “forward model” in
which the expected sensory consequences of self-generated action
are attenuated in order to enhance perception of external events
(Wolpert et al., 1995; Bays et al., 2006; Shergill et al., 2012). Other
research has linked passive self-touch and body representation
through an adapted version of the RHI paradigm (“Somatic RHI,”
Ehrsson et al., 2005). In the Somatic RHI, the experimenter
uses one of the blindfolded subject’s fingers to touch a fake
hand while synchronously touching the participant’s other hand.
This causes the sensation that the subject is touching his own
hand and is associated with the mislocalization of the subject’s
touched hand toward the position of the fake hand (Ehrsson
et al., 2005; White et al., 2010; Davies et al., 2013; Pozeg et al.,
2014). Previous studies have focused on passive self-touch, yet
in real life self-touch is typically caused by voluntary movements
and thus includes predictive efferent signals, which may have an
important role in establishing bodily self-representation through
sensorimotor correspondences. Two contrary predictions could
be made regarding the effects of active self-touch on the RHI:
First, as active self-touch is associated with an attenuation of
subjective tactile intensity and neural activation though efferent
signals (e.g., Bays et al., 2005; Shergill et al., 2012) one could
expect a reduced illusion due to attenuation of the tactile signal.
Contrarily, efferent signals may boost the illusion though the
addition of sensorimotor correspondences binding the tactile
feedback to the self.
Here, in three experiments, we tested the effects of active
and passive self-touch on body ownership. We hypothesized that
active self-touch would induce stronger illusory self-ownership
in the somatic and visual versions of the RHI due to the
addition of efferent signals providing additional sensorimotor
correspondences. We employed both subjective measures of
illusory self-touch and illusory self-ownership (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005;
Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Rohde et al., 2011; Kalckert and
Ehrsson, 2012; Pozeg et al., 2014) as measured by questionnaires
and objective measures of proprioceptive drift (Botvinick and
Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and
Haggard, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Kammers et al., 2009;
Tsakiris, 2010) which are well-established measures of bodily
illusions (but see Rohde et al., 2011). Across three experiments
and two variants of the RHI we found that active self-touch
enhanced the illusory ownership.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty participants were recruited through an advertisement at
The University of Tokyo and TokyoMetropolitan University. All
participants were healthy, right-handed, had normal or corrected
to normal vision, normal touch perception and no history of
neurological or psychiatric conditions as assessed by self-report.
All experiments involved different groups of participants. All
participants had no preliminary knowledge about the RHI and
the purpose of the experiment and gave written informed consent
before the beginning of the experiments. The experiments were
approved by the Ethics Committee in School of Engineering; The
University of Tokyo followed the ethical standards laid down
in the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants were reimbursed for
their participation in the experiment with 1000 JPY per hour.
Robotic Master-slave System and Virtual
Reality
A robotic master-slave system (see Figure 1A) was used
throughout all the experiments. The participants held the handle
of a master robot with their right hands and manipulated it to
interact with a virtual left hand (see Figure 1B). When the tip of
the handle touched the virtual hand the master robot rendered
a virtual stiffness at the participants’ right hand based on the
contact state. The movement of the master robot was sent to a
slave robot, which applied a tactile stimulus to the participants’
left hand in real time. Therefore, the participants could feel as if
they were touching their own left hand.
A custom-made two-degrees-of-freedom (2-DOF) parallel-
link robot was adopted as the slave robot. In the slave robot,
two DC motors (RH-8D 6006, Harmonic Drive Systems), which
had harmonic gear heads with 1/50 reduction ratio and optical
encoders with 1000 ppr resolution, produced movement in the X
and Z directions and sufficient contact force on the participants’
hand. The DC motors were controlled by motor drivers (4-Q-
DC Servoamplifier LSC 30/2,Maxon) based on command voltage
from a multifunction data acquisition device (NI PCIe-6323,
National Instruments) installed on a desktop computer. A plastic
cap was attached to the tip of the slave robot so that the slave
robot safely interacted with the participants’ left hand. As for
the master robot, we adopted a PHANToM Omni (Geomagic
formally SensAble), which is a commercialized 3-DOF haptic
device with a pen-type handle, because of its easy availability
and good force-display function (maximum force: ∼3.3N); a
previous experiment confirmed that the pen-type handle is
intuitive for the participants to apply stroking and tapping to a
rubber hand (Hara et al., 2011). The position sensing function
of the master robot (resolution: ∼0.055mm) was employed to
measure the proprioceptive drift (see Figure 1C). Themaster and
slave robots were arranged in front of the participants so that the
distance between the two robots was 200mm (see Figure 1A).
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup and paradigm. (A) The robotic master-slave systems as well as the experimental setup are shown. The 2-DOF slave robot is
controlled by the master robot to apply touch (tapping) on the back of participants’ left hands in the Z (vertical) direction (see Video 1). When the slave robot
contacted the participants’ left hands, the master robot (PHANToM Omni) produces a virtual force based on a defined virtual dynamics of the virtual hand (mass:
M = 0.0 kg; viscosity: D = 0.0 Ns/mm; stiffness: K = 1.0 N/mm) via an impedance controller. (B) A virtual scenario rendered with OpenGL and GLEW was projected
on the HMD in a stereoscopic view. (1) In the active self-touch conditions, the participants’ left and right hands were presented through the HMD. (2) In the passive
self-touch conditions, an experimenter’s right hand was also presented above the participants’ right hands as to mimic the action of the experimenter. (3) In the
classical RHI stimulation (Experiment 3 only), the participants’ right hands were removed from view (2). The movements of virtual right hands were linked to the master
robot and the virtual left hand never moved. The distance between the physical left hand and the tapping hand (either one of the participants or the experimenter) was
always 200mm. (C) In Experiments 1 and 2, the drifts of the participants’ right hands were measured. First, an experimenter moved the pen-type handle of master
robot connected to the participants’ right hands 350mm away from their left hands. (1) Before stimulation, the participants were asked to return the handle to the
position where their right hands were, whereas they pointed to the tapping position after stimulation. In addition to the measurement of right hand drift, the drift of left
hand was measured in Experiment 3. (2) In the measurement of left hand drift, the participants were asked to indicate the felt position of their left middle fingers with
the handle before and after each experimental block.
Instead of the rubber hand, a virtual hand was constructed
with a force display function of the PHANToM Omni based on
the position where the slave robot contacted the participants’
left hand. To increase the self-touch experience, we used an
impedance controller to simulate stiffness of the virtual hand (1.0
N/mm). The position of the slave robot was controlled on the
basis of the movement of the master robot. The robot control was
performed with 1ms sampling time (i.e., 1 kHz sampling rate).
Thus, the intrinsic delay of the robotic system was around 1ms.
A head mounted display (HMD: HMZ-T1, Sony, resolution:
1280 × 720 pixels in each screen) was employed to display 3D
graphics of virtual experimental environment (virtual hands and
a virtual stick) in stereoscopic view in Experiments 2 and 3 (see
Figure 1B); the 3D graphics were rendered by using OpenGL and
GLEW. The estimated intrinsic delay of the HMD is∼33ms. The
behavior of the virtual right hand was rendered synchronously
or asynchronously with the movement of the master robot
manipulated by the participants (active stimulations) or an
experimenter (passive or classical stimulations). During all three
experiments, white noise was presented to the participants
through headphones on the HMD to mask the noise generated
by the master and slave robots.
Dependent Measures
Proprioceptive Drift
We measured the effects of experimental manipulations
on the change in proprioceptive sense of location (i.e.,
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proprioceptive drift–PD) of participants’ right, touch-
administering (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) or left, touch-receiving
hand (Experiment 3). The PD of the touch-administering hand
was defined as a difference between the right hand location
judgments before and after each experimental block. To obtain
the pre-stimulation judgments, the experimenter lifted the
participants’ right hand, attached to the handle of the master
robot, and positioned it ∼150mm rightwards from the initial
position. The participants were then asked to point with their
right hand (attached to the handle) to the location of the initial
position. Similarly, to obtain the post-stimulation judgments,
the experimenter displaced participants’ right hand ∼150mm
rightwards (or approximately 150mm rightwards) from where
they were tapping the virtual hand, and the participants were
then asked to point to the location where they were touching
the virtual hand during the experimental block (see Figure 1C).
The pointed positions were measured by the position sensing
function of the master device in a high precision. The PD for
right hand was calculated as the difference between the pointed
position before and after each experimental block.
When measuring the PD for the left, touch-receiving hand
(Experiment 3), participants were asked before and after each
experimental block to point with their right hand (attached to the
handle of the master robot) to the felt position of their left middle
finger (see Figure 1C). The PD was defined as the difference
between the pre- and post-stimulation measures.
Illusion Questionnaire
A 6-item questionnaire was used to measure the strength of
experienced self-touch illusion. The items were adapted from
the somatic-RHI questionnaire. The first two items referred to
the sense of illusory self-touch (Q1–“I felt like I was tapping
my left hand”) and the sense of agency (Q2–“The touch on my
left hand matched the movements I made with my right hand”).
The other items were unrelated to the bodily illusion and served
as a control for suggestibility (Q3–“I felt like my left hand was
becoming bigger”; Q4–“I couldn’t feel my left hand”; Q5–“I felt
as if I had more than one left hand”; Q6–“I felt my left hand was
moving”). The participants were asked to designate on a 7-point
Likert scale the strength of their agreement with each item (0 =
“strongly disagree,” 6 = “strongly agree”). An item, referring to
the sense of illusory ownership over the virtual hand (Q7–“I felt
as if the virtual hand was my own left hand”), was added to the
questionnaire in Experiments 2 and 3.
Statistical Analysis
The questionnaire ratings for each item as well as proprioceptive
drift measures in each condition were averaged across trials
for each participant. Due to deviation from normal distribution
(Shapiro-Wilk test for normality), the averaged questionnaire
ratings of each item from all three experiments were first analyzed
with the Friedman test, and if significant, they were followed
up with pairwise comparisons, using the 2-tailed Wilcoxon’s
signed rank test. Three planned comparisons were made for
the data sets in Experiments 1 and 2, where the ratings of the
synchronous conditions were compared with their respective
asynchronous pair, and those of the two synchronous, but
different mode of tactile stimuli administration, with each other.
The level of significance was corrected for multiple comparisons
using the Bonferroni method, where corrected α = 0.05/3 =
0.0167. The planned comparisons of the questionnaire data
in Experiment 3 were made by first comparing the ratings
between synchronous and asynchronous conditions; and then,
among active-synchronous, passive-synchronous, and classical-
synchronous conditions. The α-level was therefore corrected
for six comparisons using the Bonferroni method, resulting in
corrected α = 0.05/6 = 0.008. The PDs of each experiment
were analyzed with repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with two within-participants factors: Stimulation type
and Synchrony. When the sphericity was violated in Experiment
3 (Mauchly’s test of sphericity), the repeated measures ANOVA
p-values were corrected by Greenhouse-Geisser’s epsilon (Bolton
et al., 2007) and if significant, followed-up with pairwise
comparisons, using 2-tailed, paired-sample t-tests. We used the
same planned pairwise comparisons and the correction of the α-
level as for the questionnaire data. One-sample, two-tailed t-test
was used to verify whether the PDs significantly differed from
zero (i.e., no drift).
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Experiment 1: Active and Passive Somatic
RHI
Participants
Thirteen participants (three females) participated in Experiment
1. Their age ranged between 20 and 39 years (M = 27.0,
SD = 6.5).
Experimental Design and Procedure
In Experiment 1 we investigated the effect of active (self-
administered) stimulation on the sense of illusory self-touch
using the somatic version of the RHI (somatic-RHI) paradigm
(Ehrsson et al., 2005; White et al., 2010). In a 2 × 2
repeated measures design we manipulated Stimulation type
(active vs. passive self-touch) and Synchrony (synchronous vs.
asynchronous tactile stimulation).
Prior to the experiment (i.e., training session), participants
were instructed how to manipulate the robotic device and were
explained the general procedure of the experiment. During the
experiment, blindfolded participants sat in front of a table with
their left hand (palm down) placed on the base of the slave
robot while holding the pen-type handle of the master robot
with their right hand. In the active self-touch conditions, the
participants manipulated the handle to tap a virtual left hand,
created with a force display function at the level of the master
robot, rendered 200mm to the right from the participants’ left
hand. In the passive self-touch conditions, the experimenter
guided the participants’ right hand with the handle of the
master robot to touch (tap) the virtual hand. In the synchronous
conditions, the actuatedmovements and received tactile feedback
were synchronous, whereas in the asynchronous conditions, a
constant 500ms delay was applied to the movement of the
slave robot (Blanke et al., 2014), resulting in delayed tactile
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contact between the slave robot and participants’ left hand.
The 500ms delay used in the asynchronous is an established
method for the asynchronous condition in bodily illusions (e.g.,
Shimada et al., 2005; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Shimada et al.,
2009; Blanke et al., 2014). In each experimental block, the
tapping stimulation lasted 30 s. Each of the four conditions
was repeated five times and presented to the participants in a
randomized order. At the end of each experimental block, we
first recorded the PD measurements and then administered the
illusion questionnaire.
Illusion Questionnaire Ratings
The analysis of the questionnaire data using the Friedman test
showed statistically significant differences between the conditions
on the ratings of the illusory self-touch [Q1: “I felt like I was
touching my left hand”; χ2(3) = 29.93, p < 0.001]. The post-
hoc planned comparison showed that stronger self-touch illusion
was experienced when the tactile stimulation was synchronous
as compared to asynchronous in the active [synchronous: M =
4.37, SD = 1.48; asynchronous: M = 1.86, SD = 1.60;
Z = − 3.18, p = 0.001, α(corr.) = 0.0167, r = 0.62] as well
as in the passive conditions [synchronous:M = 3.28, SD = 1.69;
asynchronous: M = 1.58, SD = 1.64; Z = −3.11, p = 0.002,
α(corr.) = 0.0167, r = 0.61]. Importantly, the experience of
illusory self-touch was stronger in the active-synchronous than
in the passive-synchronous conditions [Z = −2.80, p = 0.005,
α(corr.)= 0.0167, r = 0.56].
Statistically significant differences between the conditions
were also found for the ratings of the sense of agency [Q2: “The
touch on my left hand matched the movements I made with my
right hand”; χ2(3) = 33.52, p < 0.001]. The planned post-hoc
comparisons revealed that the participants experienced stronger
sense of agency when the tactile stimulation was synchronous in
the active [synchronous: M = 5.26, SD = 0.84; asynchronous:
M = 1.48, SD = 1.40; Z = −3.18, p = 0.001, α(corr.) = 0.0167,
r = 0.62] as well as in the passive conditions [synchronous:
M = 4.51, SD = 0.86; asynchronous: M = 1.12, SD = 1.19;
Z = −3.18, p = 0.001, α(corr.)= 0.0167, r = 0.62]. As predicted,
during the synchronous stimulation, the sense of agency was
enhanced in the active as compared to the passive condition
[Z = −2.84, p = 0.005, α(corr.)= 0.0167, r = 0.56].
The ratings of the other four items were low (M < 0.50, SD
< 0.70) and did not significantly differ across the four conditions
[Q3: χ2(3) = 0.82, p = 0.845; Q4: χ2(3) = 1.90, p = 0.593; Q5:
χ
2(3) = 4.16, p = 0.245; Q6: χ2(3) = 0.97, p = 0.809].
Proprioceptive Drift of the Touch-administering Hand
Statistical analyses for proprioceptive drift of the touch-
administering hand showed no significant main effects of
Stimulation type [active: M = 2.34, SD = 5.65; passive: M =
2.21, SD = 8.25; F(1, 12) = 0.00, p = 0.956, η
2
= 0.00] and
Synchrony [synchronous: M = 3.21, SD = 6.84; asynchronous:
M = 1.34; SD = 5.16; F(1, 12) = 2.69, p = 0.127, η
2
= 0.18].
Statistically insignificant was also the interaction between the two
factors [F(1, 12) = 0.06, p = 0.813, η
2
= 0.01]. Additionally,
one-sample two-tailed t-tests showed that the mean PDs did
not significantly differ from zero (i.e., no drift) in any of the
experimental conditions [active-synchronous: M = 3.47, SD =
8.11; t(12) = 1.54, p = 0.149; active-asynchronous: M = 1.21,
SD = 5.75, t(12) = 0.76, p = 0.464; passive-synchronous: M =
2.95, SD = 10.10, t(12) = 1.05, p = 0.313; passive-asynchronous:
M = 1.47, SD = 7.13, t(12) = 0.75, p = 0.470].
Thus, the results of Experiment 1 (Figure 2A) indicated that
synchronous active self-touch elicited stronger illusory self-touch
than synchronous passive self-touch in the absence of visual
feedback.
Experiment 2: Active and Passive Visual
RHI
Participants
Fifteen participants (10 females) took part in Experiment 2. Their
age ranged between 18 and 41 years (M = 23.9, SD = 5.6).
Experimental Design and Procedure
In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of active (self-
administered) stimulation on the strength of self-touch illusion
and sense of illusory ownership over the virtual hand. Thus,
we adapted and combined the somatic-RHI and classical RHI
paradigms for the use in the virtual reality and robotic setting.
As in Experiment 1, we manipulated Stimulation type and
Synchrony in a 2 × 2 repeated measures design. We readapted
the experimental procedure from Experiment 1 by adding visual
cues of the virtual hands. Thus, a virtual scenario matching the
experimental manipulation was projected through the HMD [see
Figure 1B (1) for active conditions and Figure 1B (2) for passive
conditions]. Similar to Experiment 1, each experimental block
lasted 30 s, the order of the four conditions was randomized
across the participants and each condition was repeated five
times. The PD for the right, touch-administering hand was
measured in the same manner as in Experiment 1 and the
initial position of the participants’ right hand matched the
position of the virtual left hand projected onto the HMD.
During the measurement of right hand localization, the virtual
hands were not displayed on the HMD. At the end of each
experimental block the participants also answered to the illusion
questionnaire used in Experiment 1, which now also included an
additional item referring to the sense of illusory ownership for
the virtual hand (Q7–“I felt as if virtual hand was my own left
hand”).
Illusion Questionnaire Ratings
The ratings of the illusory self-touch significantly differed
between the four conditions [Q1: “I felt like I was touching my
left hand”; χ2(3) = 31.71, p < 0.001]. The planned pairwise
comparisons showed that synchronous tactile stimulation
increased the self-touch illusion in the active [synchronous:M =
4.15, SD = 1.45; asynchronous: M = 2.56, SD = 1.78;
Z = −2.75, p = 0.006, α(corr.) = 0.0167, r = 0.50] as well
as in the passive conditions [synchronous: M = 2.82, SD =
1.52; asynchronous: M = 1.05, SD = 0.97; Z = −3.41, p =
0.001, α(corr.) = 0.0167, r = 0.62]. During the synchronous
stimulation, the participants reported stronger self-touch illusion
when the tactile stimuli were actively applied to the hands
[Z = −3.33, p = 0.001, α(corr.)= 0.0167, r = 0.61].
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1509
Hara et al. Voluntary self-touch increases body ownership
A
B
C
FIGURE 2 | Mean questionnaire ratings and proprioceptive drifts. (A) Mean questionnaire ratings and mean PDs for right hand in Experiment 1. The sense
of illusory self-touch was enhanced in synchronous stimulation compared to asynchronous stimulation. Additionally, the participants reported stronger illusion when they
(Continued)
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FIGURE 2 | Continued
actively touched the virtual hand and their own hands with the master-slave system. Neither synchrony nor stimulation type modulated the PD. (B) Mean questionnaire
ratings and mean PDs for right hand in Experiment 2. In addition to the sense of illusory self-touch, the participants reported stronger illusory ownership over the virtual
left hand with synchronous and active stimulation. Greater PD was found in the passive stimulation conditions. (C) Mean questionnaire ratings, PDs for both left and
right hands in Experiment 3, and correlation between the sense of agency and sense of hand ownership for active-synchronous and passive-synchronous conditions.
The illusory self-touch was induced in active and passive self-touch, and all the stimulation types allowed the participants to experience the illusory ownership over the
virtual left hand. The experience of RHI became stronger in the order of active self-touch, passive self-touch, and classical stimulation. The PDs for right hand did not
show any significance, but a greater PD for left hand was observed with synchronous stimulation in active self-touch. In the graphs, Act/Pass/Cls and Sync/Async
mean active self-touch/passive self-touch/classical stimulation and synchronous/asynchronous, respectively.
The ratings of the sense of agency also significantly differed
across the four conditions [Q2: “The touch on my left hand
matched the movements I made with my right hand”; χ2(3) =
33.41, p < 0.001]. The follow-up planned pairwise comparisons
showed that the sense of agency was rated stronger after the
synchronous than the asynchronous tactile stimulation in the
active [synchronous: M = 4.56, SD = 1.26; asynchronous:
M = 1.83, SD = 1.52; Z = −3.10, p = 0.002, α(corr.) = 0.0167,
r = 0.57] as well as in the passive conditions [synchronous:
M = 3.61, SD = 1.46; asynchronous: M = 0.97, SD = 0.83;
Z = −3.41, p = 0.001, α(corr.) = 0.0167, r = 0.62]. As
we predicted, active tactile administration in the synchronous
condition resulted in stronger sense of agency than in the passive-
synchronous conditions [Z = −3.19, p = 0.001, α(corr.) =
0.0167, r = 0.58].
The Friedman test showed statistically significant differences
in the ratings of illusory ownership over the virtual hand across
the four conditions [Q7: “I felt as if virtual hand was my own
left hand”; χ2(3) = 20.90, p < 0.001]. The planned post-hoc
comparisons showed that the sense of illusory ownership was
stronger when the tactile stimulation was synchronous in both,
active [synchronous: M = 3.43, SD = 1.77; asynchronous:
M = 2.28, SD = 1.82; Z = −2.44, p = 0.015, α(corr.) = 0.0167,
r = 0.44] and passive conditions [synchronous: M = 2.62,
SD = 1.73; asynchronous: M = 1.65, SD = 1.64; Z = −2.79,
p = 0.005, α(corr.) = 0.0167, r = 0.50]. Importantly, the
active stimulation increased the illusory ownership of the virtual
hand as compared to the passive stimulation in the synchronous
conditions [Z = −2.45, p = 0.014, α(corr.) = 0.0167,
r = 0.45].
The ratings of the other four items were low (M = 1.80, SD <
1.80) and were not significantly modulated by the experimental
conditions [Q3: χ2(3) = 2.46, p = 0.482; Q4: χ2(3) = 0.80,
p = 0.849; Q5: χ2(3) = 2.17, p = 0.538; Q6: χ2(3) = 0.19,
p = 0.980].
Proprioceptive Drift of the Touch-administering Hand
Statistical analyses showed a significantmain effect of Stimulation
type [active: M = 6.26, SD = 10.49; passive: M = 13.52,
SD = 11.65; F(1, 14) = 15.28, p = 0.002, η
2
= 0.52] but no
significant main effect of Synchrony [synchronous: M = 10.25,
SD = 9.58; asynchronous: M = 9.52, SD = 12.61; F(1, 14) =
0.13, p = 0.726, η2 = 0.01] and no significant interaction
between these two factors [F(1, 14) = 0.26, p = 0.617, η
2
=
0.02]. One-sample two-tailed t-tests revealed that the mean PDs
significantly differed from zero in all experimental conditions
[active-synchronous: M = 7.19, SD = 11.89; t(14) = 2.34, p =
0.035; passive-synchronous: M = 13.31, SD = 11.41, t(14) =
4.52, p < 0.001; passive-asynchronous: M = 13.72, SD = 13.16,
t(14) = 4.04, p = 0.001], except in one experimental condition
[active-asynchronous: M = 5.33, SD = 13.51, t(14) = 1.53,
p = 0.149].
The results of Experiment 2 (Figure 2B) indicated that with
visual feedback, synchronous active self-touch elicited stronger
illusory self-touch and sense of ownership over the virtual hand
than synchronous passive self-touch. No synchrony-related PD
was found for the touch-administering hand.
Experiment 3: Comparison of Active,
Passive, and Classical RHI
Participants
Twelve participants (six females) participated in Experiment 3.
Their age ranged between 21 and 32 years (M = 25.8, SD = 2.6).
Experimental Design and Procedure
In Experiment 3, we directly compared the role of experimental
factors investigated in Experiments 1 and 2 to the classical RHI
condition (touch completely administrated by an experimenter).
Thus, we used a 3 × 2 factorial design with the within-
participants factors of Stimulation type (active self-stimulation,
passive self-stimulation, and classical tactile stimulation) and
Synchrony (synchronous vs. asynchronous). Importantly, in this
last experiment, we measured the PDs for both right and left
hands. During each experimental block, participants viewed
an appropriate virtual scenario through the HMD (Figure 1B).
Similar to Experiments 1 and 2, each experimental block lasted
30 s, and six conditions were randomly presented and repeated
10 times; this yielded a total of 60 experimental blocks. At the
end of each experimental block, the participants responded to
the same questionnaire used in Experiment 2. The measurement
of right hand localization was performed as in Experiments 1
and 2, with the only difference that we asked the participants to
localize the position in which they saw the experimenter’s tapping
in the classical RHI experimental blocks (as the participants never
moved their hands). In Experiment 3, we additionally measured
the drifts of participants’ left hand. Thus, before and after the
experimental manipulation, the participants were asked to move
their right hand (attached to the handle of the master robot)
so as to point to the felt position of their left middle fingers
(see Figure 1C). Both the right and left drifts were measured
in two measurement orders (i.e., first for right/left hand drifts
and second for left/right hand drifts) in each experimental block.
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Each measurement order was presented five times and was
balanced across participants.
Illusion Questionnaire Ratings
We first investigated the effects of active and passive self-touch
as well as the classical RHI (tactile stimulation administered
by an experimenter) on subjective ratings (see Figure 2C). The
Friedman test showed that the ratings of the illusory self-touch
significantly differed between the experimental conditions [Q1:
“I felt like I was touching my left hand” χ2(5) = 50.09,
p < 0.001]. The planned pairwise comparisons revealed that
the illusory self-touch was experienced significantly stronger
in the active-synchronous (M = 4.29, SD = 1.51) than in
the active-asynchronous conditions [M = 2.47, SD = 1.55;
Z = −3.06, p = 0.002, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.63]. The
ratings of illusory self-touch were also significantly higher in the
passive-synchronous (M = 3.48, SD = 1.54) as compared to
the passive-asynchronous condition [M = 2.15, SD = 1.72;
Z = −2.65, p = 0.008, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.53]. As
predicted, low scores and no difference in the self-touch ratings
between synchronous (M = 1.08, SD = 1.43) and asynchronous
stimulation (M = 0.98, SD = 1.45) were found in the classical
RHI tactile stimulation [Z = −0.42, p = 0.673, α(corr.) = 0.008,
r = 0.09]. Moreover, the ratings of the illusory self-touch in the
active-synchronous condition were significantly higher than the
ratings in the passive-synchronous [Z = −2.937, p = 0.003,
α(corr.)= 0.008, r = 0.60] and classical-synchronous conditions
[Z = −3.062, p = 0.002, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.63], and
ratings in the passive-synchronous condition were significantly
higher than the ratings in the classical-synchronous condition
[Z = −3.06, p = 0.002, α(corr.)= 0.008, r = 0.62].
Significant differences between the experimental conditions
were also found for the ratings of the sense of agency [Q2: “The
touch on my left hand matched the movements I made with my
right hand”; χ2(5) = 46.68, p < 0.001]. The planned pairwise
comparisons revealed that the sense of agency was experienced
significantly stronger in the active-synchronous (M = 4.92,
SD = 1.07) than in the active-asynchronous conditions [M =
2.12, SD = 1.69; Z = −3.06, p = 0.002, α(corr.) = 0.008,
r = 0.62]. Similarly, the passive-synchronous stimulation (M =
4.24, SD = 1.18) resulted in higher ratings than the passive-
asynchronous stimulation [M = 1.83, SD = 1.47; Z =
−3.06, p = 0.002, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.62], whereas the
synchrony of tapping did not affect the sense of agency in the
classical RHI condition (synchronous: M = 1.28, SD = 1.53;
asynchronous: M = 0.75, SD = 1.29; Z = −1.95, p = 0.051,
α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.40]. Moreover, the sense of agency
was stronger in the active-synchronous than in the passive-
synchronous (Z = −2.65, p = 0.008, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.54]
and classical-synchronous conditions [Z = −3.06, p = 0.002,
α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.62]. The sense of agency was also rated
stronger in the passive-synchronous as compared to the classical-
synchronous condition [Z = −3.06, p = 0.002, α(corr.)= 0.008,
r = 0.63].
The Friedman test also detected statistically significant
differences between the experimental manipulations in the
ratings of illusory ownership [Q7: “I felt as if the virtual hand
was my own left hand”; χ2(5) = 44.56, p < 0.001]. The planned
post-hoc comparisons showed that the synchrony of tapping
significantly increased the ratings of illusory ownership when the
type of stimulation was active [active-synchronous: M = 4.18,
SD = 1.63; active-asynchronous: M = 2.58, SD = 1.61;
Z = −3.06, p = 0.002, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.63] as well as
passive self-touch [passive-synchronous: M = 3.72, SD = 1.60;
passive-asynchronous: M = 2.44, SD = 1.66; Z = −2.98,
p = 0.003, α(corr.)= 0.008, r = 0.61] but not in the classical RHI
tactile stimulation [classical-synchronous:M = 2.93, SD = 1.52;
classical-asynchronous: M = 2.12, SD = 1.67; Z = −2.19,
p = 0.028, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.45]. When the stimulation
was synchronous active self-touch resulted in higher ownership
ratings than passive self-touch [Z = −3.066, p = 0.002, α(corr.)
= 0.008, r = 0.63] or touch administered by the experimenter
in the classical RHI [Z = −3.06, p = 0.002, α(corr.) = 0.008,
r = 0.63]. The hand ownership ratings were also higher in
the passive-synchronous as compared to classical-synchronous
condition [Z = −2.91, p = 0.004, α(corr.) = 0.008, r = 0.59].
No significant differences between the experimental
conditions were found for the ratings of the other four
questionnaire items [Q3: χ2(5) = 5.37, p = 0.373; Q4:
χ
2(5) = 7.52, p = 0.185; Q5: χ2(5) = 9.88, p = 0.079; Q6:
χ
2(5) = 8.04, p = 0.154].
Proprioceptive Drift of the Touch-administering Hand
The ANOVA showed that neither Stimulation type [active: M =
4.54, SD = 7.89; passive: M = 3.28, SD = 4.53; classical: M =
1.55, SD = 7.80; F(1.26, 13.88) = 0.56, p = 0.581, η
2
= 0.05] nor
Synchrony [synchronous: M = 2.81, SD = 5.50, asynchronous:
M = 3.43, SD = 4.35; F(1, 11) = 0.13; p = 0.730; η
2
= 0.01]
significantly affected the PD of the participants’ right (i.e., touch-
administering) hand. Interaction between Stimulation type and
Synchrony was also not significant [F(2, 22) = 1.84; p = 0.183;
η
2
= 0.14].
Proprioceptive Drift of the Touch-receiving Hand
The analysis of the PD of the left, touch-receiving hand showed
a statistically significant main effect of Stimulation type [active:
M = 10.57, SD = 8.66, passive: M = 7.40, SD = 7.84,
classical: M = −0.77, SD = 5.97; F(2, 22) = 6.60, p = 0.006;
χ
2
= 0.38] and Synchrony [synchronous: M = 9.54, SD = 6.52,
asynchronous: M = 1.93, SD = 5.75; F(1, 11) = 7.89, p =
0.017; χ2 = 0.42] on the PD of the participants’ left (i.e., touch-
receiving) hand. The interaction between the two experimental
manipulations was not statistically significant [F(2, 22) = 1.59;
p = 0.23;χ2 = 0.13]. A post-hoc analysis of planned comparisons
using a paired-sample two-tailed t-test showed that the PD after
active and synchronous self-touch (active-synchronous: M =
16.56, SD = 11.27) was significantly larger than the PD after
the active and asynchronous self-touch [active-asynchronous:
M = 4.57, SD = 8.58, t(11) = 4.13, p = 0.002, α(corr.) =
0.008, r = 0.78] and larger than the PD after the synchronous
tactile stimulation in the classical RHI [classical-synchronous:
M = 1.45, SD = 8.47; t(11) = 4.48, p = 0.001, α(corr.) =
0.008, r = 0.80]. The other planned comparisons did not yield
statistically significant differences (all p > 0.008).
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Correlation between the Sense of Agency and Hand
Ownership
In order to investigate the strength of the relationship between
the sense of agency and hand ownership, we combined and
correlated the ratings of the sense of agency (Q2) and illusory
hand ownership (Q7) in the synchronous tactile stimulation from
Experiments 2 and 3. The analysis revealed a strong positive
relationship when the type of the tactile stimulation was active
[Pearson’s r(27) = 0.597, p = 0.001, α(corr.) = 0.025] as well
as when it was passive [Pearson’s r(27) = 0.569, p = 0.002,
α(corr.)= 0.025].
DISCUSSION
Illusory Self-touch and Illusory Ownership
The present experiments investigated the induction of the well-
established RHI, using active self-touch. We used a novel
adaptation of the RHI employing a robotic master-slave system,
which allowed participants to induce the tactile stimulation
actively, thus introducing movement related efferent information
to the illusion. Collectively, the results showed three main
findings: First, active self-touch compared to passive self-touch
increased subjective scores of illusory self-touch (Experiments
1 and 2) and also of illusory ownership (Experiment 2) in the
somatic and visual versions of the RHI. Second, both active
and passive self-touch increased illusory ownership of the virtual
hand compared to the classical tactile only induction of the
RHI (Experiment 3). Finally, proprioceptive drift, an objective
measure of illusory body ownership was found only for the
touch-receiving hand (Experiment 3) and was larger for active
self-touch compared to the classical tactile RHI condition.
Agency and Illusory Ownership
While body ownership has classically been related to
multisensory integration of passive sensory signals (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2005; Tsakiris and Haggard,
2005; Blanke, 2012) recent research has shown that sensorimotor
correlations based on efferent signals provide important
information for body ownership (Dummer et al., 2009; Kammers
et al., 2009; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012; Suzuki et al., 2013),
suggesting a role of motor signals in the formation of body
representations. Experiments using matching visuo-motor
stimulations have shown that these induce sensations of body
ownership for limbs as well as bodies (Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010;
Walsh et al., 2011; Banakou et al., 2013; Rognini et al., 2013).
Here we go beyond visuo-motor correlations to show that motor
signals present in active self-touch increase illusory ownership
of a hand with respect to passive self-touch (proprioceptive
signals) and classical RHI (tactile only). This finding expands
previous works showing that passive multisensory visuo-tactile
integration induces illusory ownership (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998; Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005; Costantini and Haggard, 2007;
Ionta et al., 2011; Salomon et al., 2013b) by showing that efferent
motor information is integrated and enhances the illusion.
From a theoretical perspective, this is in line with accounts
suggesting that action and motor signals have an important
role in the formation of the sense of bodily self (Knoblich,
2002; van den Bos and Jeannerod, 2002; Blakemore and Frith,
2003; Schütz-Bosbach et al., 2006; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Salomon
et al., 2009, 2013a). Furthermore, these findings show that the
efferent motor information is integrated with not only visual
signals as in previous visuo-motor RHI studies (Dummer et al.,
2009; Kammers et al., 2009; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010; Kalckert
and Ehrsson, 2012, 2014; Banakou et al., 2013; Banakou and
Slater, 2014) but also afferent proprioceptive and tactile signals
which are thought to be central to body ownership (Blanke,
2012; Palluel et al., 2012). We suggest that this increase in
the subjective aspect of the illusion is due to the additional
information provided by the efferent motor signals of self-
authored movements. These signals bolstering correspondence
between the afferent sensory inputs and the predicted sensory
consequences of the self-generated action provide an important
source of self-related information (Tsakiris et al., 2005, 2006;
Rognini et al., 2013; Salomon et al., 2013a) which in turn affects
the incorporation of the virtual hand to the self. Interestingly,
previous studies of self-touch have shown that tactile signals
associated with self-touch are suppressed both at the behavioral
level (Blakemore et al., 2000) and in the brain (Blakemore
et al., 1998; Bays et al., 2006; Dieguez et al., 2009; Shergill et al.,
2012; Martuzzi et al., 2015). While this suppression of tactile
perception may seem to suggest that self-touch should have
lower impact on a tactile based bodily illusion, we advocate an
opposing interpretation, namely that the same predictive models
underlying the tactile attenuation are also responsible for the
increase in illusory ownership. Recent theories have suggested
an important role for predictive coding (Friston, 2010) in
establishing a model of the self (Clark, 2013; Apps and Tsakiris,
2014). These theories propose that the self is constructed
through a Bayesian computation minimizing the prediction
errors (incongruences between predicted and incoming sensory
signals). Here, the addition of efferent information through
active self-touch introduces further predictive signals that, when
matched with the tactile sensations, strengthen the illusion that
the hand belongs to the self. The efferent information, which
is related to self-authored movements, may allow a reduction
of the prediction errors though the increased sensorimotor
correspondences. Thus, the convergence of multiple signals may
enhance the illusory ownership. This is supported by our data,
which shows a hierarchy of illusory embodiment based on the
availability of motor (active), proprioceptive (passive) or tactile
only (classical RHI) conditions.
Mislocalization of the Hand
The RHI is typically associated with a mislocalization of
the stimulated hand toward the fake hand, often termed
“proprioceptive drift” (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998; Costantini
and Haggard, 2007; but see Rohde et al., 2011; Davies et al., 2013).
Our novel robotic setup allowed precise and well controlled
measurements of proprioceptive drift. Recently it has been
proposed that such proprioceptive drift may be also presented
on the hand administering the tactile stroking in the somatic-
RHI (White et al., 2011). Our results (Experiment 1) did not
replicate these findings of drift on the touch-administering hand
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during the somatic-RHI. However, the two studies differed in
several aspects relating to the measurement of the proprioceptive
drift. It is possible that differences in the experimental setup
(virtual hand here vs. rubber hand inWhite et al., 2011), duration
of stimulation (30 s vs. 180 s) or the mode of measurement
(pointing vs. visual perceptual judgments) may account for this
difference. In Experiments 2 and 3 using a visual version of the
RHI no synchrony-modulated proprioceptive drift was found
for the touch-administering hand. In contrast, the results of
Experiment 3 in which proprioceptive drift was measured for
both the administering and stimulated hand show a synchrony-
modulated difference for the active condition for the tapped
hand. Critically, the drift of the touched hand in the active self-
touch condition was larger than that elicited by the classical
tactile RHI, mirroring the effects found in the subjective feeling
of illusory ownership. The results of the proprioceptive drift, an
implicit measure of body ownership, show that active self-touch
induces a larger mislocalization of the hand compared to tactile
stimulation alone, suggesting that such proprioceptive error may
also be affected by efferent predictive signals. A similar result has
also been recently found using active self-touch in the context
of the Full Body Illusion where synchronous active touch caused
changes in subjective experience (Hara et al., 2014) and a larger
proprioceptive drift of the full body compared to asynchronous
tactile feedback (Blanke et al., 2014).
CONCLUSION
In a series of three studies using a novel robotic setup we have
shown that active self-touch induces higher illusory ownership
over a virtual hand as measured by subjective explicit, as
well as objective implicit measures. Higher illusory self-touch
was induced for both somatic and visual variants of the RHI,
indicating that it is not dependent on visual feedback. Extending
the results of previous studies on active movements in shaping
our sense of bodily self (Tsakiris et al., 2006; Dummer et al.,
2009; Kammers et al., 2009; Kalckert and Ehrsson, 2012; Suzuki
et al., 2013), our results highlight the role of the correspondence
between efferent motor signals and afferent sensory inputs in
building our sense of body ownership. Thus, self-touch may have
a special role in the formation of our bodily self-representation.
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